




# **The New Security Environment for European Gas**

  
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# OIES\* Natural Gas Research Programme

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## Recently Published Research

- **Natural Gas Demand in Europe – the importance of power generation**, Anouk Honore
- **The 2007 Russia-Belarus Gas Agreement**, Katja Yafimava and Jonathan Stern
- **US Natural Gas Prices: scenarios to 2015**, Michelle Foss
- **Gas-OPEC: a distraction from important issues of Russian gas supply to Europe**, Jonathan Stern
- **The Potential Contribution of Natural Gas to Sustainable Development in South Eastern Europe**, Aleksandar Kovacevic
- **Is there a rationale for the continuing link to oil product prices in Continental European gas contracts?** Jonathan Stern
- **Italian Gas Market Liberalisation**, Alberto Cavaliere
- **Ukraine's Gas Sector**, Simon Pirani

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## THE OLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

- Reserves: where are they, are they enough for 10, 20, 50,100 years?
- Technology: do we have/could we develop technology to bring pipeline and liquefied natural gas to markets: deep water, long distance
- Cost versus price: could projects be developed at a cost which would be covered by the prices which buyers/ customers would be willing to pay?
- How would we deal with the “supply gap” which would evolve over the next 10-20 years?
- How to cope with increasing dependence on gas imports from outside the EU

**Many of these issues have not gone away  
but the context is different**



## Components of the “New Security Environment” For European Gas

- Foreseeable limits on all European supply and pipeline imports (Russia, Algeria)
- Little likelihood of significant Middle East/ Caspian pipeline supplies
- Worsening geopolitics: Russia and Middle East
- Atlantic/global competition for LNG supply
- Possible development of a “Gas-OPEC”
- Domestic security – storage – becomes increasingly important

**Without major changes: no growth in European gas demand post-2020**



## **Indigenous European Gas Supplies**

**Present knowledge of UK, Norwegian, Dutch and other Continental European gas reserves, suggests that indigenous European production will not increase beyond 2010, and are likely to decline after that date; this decline is likely to accelerate after 2015**

**There is still time for this to change but little expectation that major new gas will be found**



## Russian Gas Production 2001-06

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006*
<b>GAZPROM</b>	<b>512.0</b>	<b>522.0</b>	<b>540.1</b>	<b>545.1</b>	<b>547.9</b>	<b>551</b>
<b>OTHER PROD'ERS</b>	<b>69.2</b>	<b>73.0</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>88.4</b>	<b>92.2</b>	<b>105</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>581.2</b>	<b>595.0</b>	<b>620.4</b>	<b>633.5</b>	<b>640.8</b>	<b>656.2</b>


\*preliminary

Source: Gazprom

**Gazprom's production is stable (declining); other producers are the key to growth**



# Gazprom's Production Projection to 2030



Source: Gazprom



## **Gazprom's Exports to Europe**

- **Long term contracts extended 20-30 years with all West European buyers well before expiry dates: legally binding agreements under international arbitration with liquidated damages**
- **Gazprom Marketing and Trading establishes presence in north west Europe trading (not just Russian) gas and other products**
- **Nord Stream pipeline(s) progressing**
- **South European pipeline under study**

**Gazprom is not behaving as if it is short of gas for export to Europe, rather it is short of reliable transportation capacity**



# Nord Stream Gas Pipeline







## **Disastrous Decline of European (and US) Relations with Russia: current views of European politicians/political commentators**

- **Putin does not share European democratic or market values: free elections/media, private ownership**
- **Russians cannot be trusted to respect rule of law or legal contracts – corruption/governance issues**
- **Growing centralisation/state ownership and government control of energy means that...**
- **Russia will use oil and gas as a weapon against European and other countries in order to achieve political and commercial objectives**
- **Russia is supporting a gas cartel to attack EU interests**

**Europe needs to limit gas/energy imports,  
and downstream investments from Russia**



## **Disastrous Decline of Russian Relations with Europe (and the US) : views of Russian politicians/political commentators**

- **European governments are hypocritical about “democratic values” and the rule of law; there is one set of rules for themselves and their friends, and another for all others**
- **Western countries were happy when Russia was weak (in the 1990s) but are now uncomfortable with reassertion of legitimate Russian interests**
- **EU is now dominated by anti-Russian new Member States**
- **EU Competition regulators have tried to undermine long term gas contracts/security**
- **Russian investments in EU gas industries are subject to unfair discrimination**

**Russia will not allow western countries to dictate its domestic or international agenda**



## Likely Russian Gas Trends to 2020

- Russian gas supplies will be tight for the next several years – possibly until 2015 – until large scale Yamal gas supplies become available
- This will affect the Russian market but not Europe because of long term contract commitments
- Russian gas market moves towards “European-level” pricing will reduce the profitability gap between the markets
- No large scale additional export contracts will be signed for the foreseeable future because of Russian availability problems and European security concerns

**During the 2010s, it will no longer be profitable for Russia to expand exports to Europe**




## **GEOPOLITICS: Middle East Supplies**

- **OECD fears of Islamic fundamentalism, war on terror etc**
- **Worsening (or at least not improving) situation in Iraq**
- **Worsening relationship with Iran – UN/US sanctions**
- **Israeli-Palestinian/Lebanese problems**

**Costs and politics mean that gas exporters will increasingly prefer the flexibility of LNG over pipeline gas**



# Gas Pipelines From the Caspian Region





# Nabucco: a Possible Caspian Pipeline



Source: OMV



# European Supplies from North Africa





## African Gas Exports to Europe

### IMMEDIATE ADDITIONAL SUPPLY:

- Medgaz and Galsi – the only new dedicated pipeline gas for Europe
- Significant LNG developments: Nigeria, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Angola(?), Libya(?)


### BUT LOOMING PROBLEMS OF FUTURE EXPORT AVAILABILITY DUE TO:

- Rapidly increasing domestic demand
- Endemic political instability

**African LNG exports are as well-positioned for North American markets as for Europe**



# European LNG Terminals






## North American Gas and Atlantic Basin LNG

- North American production is declining, can production be stabilised in a price environment of \$3-6, \$8-10/mmbtu?
- lead times for Alaskan/Canadian Arctic supplies are 10-20 years; commercial/environmental/regulatory obstacles
- LNG will be the principal source of incremental gas until Arctic gas arrives; 130 Bcm of potential regasification capacity means that....
- The US will be a major competitor in Atlantic Basin LNG markets BUT...

**Attempts to project North American price developments have been COMPLETELY WRONG**



# US Natural Gas Prices 1993-2007 \$/mmbtu



Source: NGI's Daily Gas Price Index, Intelligence Press

**United States is an “unpredictable” LNG competitor**



## The Pacific Region: a global LNG competitor for Europe?

- Short term Indonesia supply crisis means that traditional Pacific buyers – Japan and Korea (possibly Taiwan) will compete for Middle East supplies and for marginal/seasonal cargoes from other Atlantic Basin suppliers
- China and India will not dominate Pacific (and certainly not global) LNG trade and will only peripherally compete with Europe for gas.

**Projections of “a global LNG market” are ahead of reality but the trend to greater global competition is real**



## An OPEC for gas? Or for LNG?

- Gas Exporting Countries forum created by objections to EU (and national) liberalization
- A chaotic organisation with unstable membership and mandate BUT...
- April 2007 meeting lent credibility to GECF as Russians now fully on board BUT
- Prime movers are LNG exporters: Algeria, Qatar, Trinidad, therefore an organisation for LNG exporters is more likely than gas exporters

**Only Iran (a net gas importer) and Venezuela (not a gas exporter) have favoured a “price setting” organisation**



## **Gas Security: perceptions versus empirical evidence**

- **Widespread assumption that imported gas is less secure than domestic supplies and infrastructure has little empirical basis**
- **The most serious gas security incident in Europe in 2006 was not the Russia-Ukraine crisis:**
  - **the fire at the UK's Rough storage reservoir in February**
  - **Uncertainties in Italy caused by a colder than usual winter**
- **How much gas has ever been stopped by “political instability”?**

**Ageing and unreliable infrastructure may become a very important problem**



## Storage Dilemmas: commercial and strategic

### COMMERCIAL:

- Security criteria: 1 in 20/1 in 50 – WHY? Analysis or tradition?
- Market-driven or regulation-driven and who pays? In the UK, “the market” did not give signals until too late; planning obstacles were a big problem

### STRATEGIC:

- Who decides to release; in what circumstances – *force majeure* or market?
- Does it prevent commercial storage?

**Security arguments on storage are confused with commercial and competition arguments**



## **European Gas Supply/Demand Cycles over the Next Decade**

- **Shortage cycle is ending in 2007 with arrival of new pipeline gas and LNG supply**
- **Surplus cycle likely from 2008-12 (maybe up to 2015) depending on power demand and Atlantic Basin LNG, BUT...**
- **Prices may stay high because of oil linkage and lack of liberalisation and competition**
- **Winters may still see high prices**

**Supply/demand balance suggests that period up to 2012/15 will be a time of surplus but post-2015 (and especially 2020) new large scale sources of gas are not clear**



## **Current Messages from Many (Most?) European Politicians and Media to Gas Suppliers – especially Russia**

- **We don't like you**
- **We don't trust you**
- **You are the main cause of European gas supply security problems**

**What is the gas industry doing to counter these messages?**



## **The New Gas Security Environment: emerging producer/exporter perspectives**

- **Increased exports are no longer desirable due to:**
  - increasing domestic demand
  - higher export prices which means reduced need for revenues
- **LNG exports will be preferable to dedicated pipeline gas to Europe because of:**
  - Greater arbitrage possibilities in higher value markets
  - Less political exposure to Europe



## **Longer Term Consequences of the New Security Environment**

**THERE IS STILL TIME FOR KEY ELEMENTS OF THIS ENVIRONMENT TO CHANGE; EVEN IF THAT DOES NOT HAPPEN, THERE WILL BE NO ENERGY DISASTER IN EUROPE, BUT:**

- **there cannot be any significant increase in gas-fired generation in Europe post-2020 which means that...**
- **other forms of generation will need to be developed**
- **switching from coal to gas will not be possible ie no short term carbon fix**
- **after 2020, European gas demand will not increase and may decline ie gas becomes a “sunset industry”**